Explaining the Problem
In order for us to make sense of the world and ourselves, it is necessary that we establish a relation of cause and effect between events. Not only do we need this relationship to make sense of perception, but we need it to make sense of our decisions, intentions, and thoughts. Think about it for a minute. If you couldn't ask "why?", and give what you felt was a relatively accurate reason for the event in question, then you would be quite lost and possibly insane. Why are you reading this blog (answer: because [insert cause or reason here])? How did you come to own a computer? How did that computer come to exist? Why do you like or dislike some things? Why do you find one argument more compelling than another? The answer to these questions reveal the causes behind them. Sometimes these causes are stated as reasons which you've come to understand by means of other causes, and those causes by infinitely more causes. Now imagine freezing time and tracing back all causes that led to you reading this blog...
The dilemma thus reveals itself: It appears that everything you've done and thought up to this point, was not your choice or by your own free will. "Choice" was just an illusion created by your consciousness. Upon reflecting, It appears your actions and ideas originate not from you, but from external causes leading back before your very birth, and leading back all the way to the creation of the universe.
When we consider your decision to read this blog, the fundamental question is, "could you have done otherwise?" Well, if you agree that there is a cause behind everything, as it appears there is, then all causes leading up to this moment determined your choice, so the answer is no. If this is the case, then you do not appear to have free will. This crisis in philosophy is known as determinism. Not only are you not responsible for your actions because they were determined by external causes, but I also cannot hold you responsible for those actions (and thus the end of morality). But I am not concerned with morality in this particular argument, but rather, whether or not we have free will.
Now, before you start quoting me and commenting vehement objections, let me explain… There is another option. Instead of assuming causality, we can assert that there is nothing determining our actions, which entails that there are no reasons or external causes leading to our decisions, intentions, or actions. If this were true however, we would thus be acting spontaneously without reason or cause. It appears this venture does not get us free will either. Why? Because free will requires willing our actions, and that implies acting on reasons - in other words *Control*. Spontaneity is not being in control of our actions, and free will requires that we are in control. Besides, we can't make sense of a world in the absence of order, with no way of establishing relationships between events. And so the paradox continues to elude us.
Solution?
[Substantially Revised]I believe the problem is in our misinterpretation of "free will." Being "able to have done otherwise" is too restrictive and narrow of a view. To discover if we have free will, lets look at something we know does not have free will. Take a machine or computer for example. It operates by receiving inputs and - according to certain rules - it gives certain outputs. This machine is absolutely determined in every way. In fact, if we had all information about this machine, it is possible to accurately predict every output for every given input. But we can build a computer to simulate human behavior, and we've done so. What are these machines lacking? They are not self-aware and they are not free to remake the rules that govern their responses. Every time the machine is fed input, it isn't free to reflect on that input or change the rules governing its criterion for output. We are free to change the rules. Because we are self-aware, with a personal identity, we can reflect on information or experience past actions. And we can then change the rules by which we react and even think (think about how your political views have changed). While you couldn't have done otherwise than reading this sentence right now, you are free to change the rules that dictated you to read this sentence.
The standard objection: What of the causal chain leading you to alter the rules which govern inputs and outputs? My response: Look at the source. The personal identity which is self-aware, gives form to the rules. And thus, "YOU" play a part in the causal history leading toward a decision.
8 comments:
We have free will because we come from a background where we’re told that a god gave it to us, so we look at it like a possession – I suppose salvation is sort of like that as well. But certainly we don’t have free will like we have brown hair….
I’ll have to give it some thought, but right out of the gate I tend to like your changing of the language to exercise.
Thanks :) I've been trying to clean this argument up a little bit, but I'm not really sure how to do it. Basically, I am proposing that "willing an action" entails an identity to will it. Identity, defined conservatively as a self-aware consciousness. And it seems this will always play a part in free and voluntary actions despite the causalism.
In any case, self-awareness is our way out of the free will problem because that's what seperates us from Alan Turing's machine intelligence, or simply reacting to nothing but input.
Because of our personal identity, not only do we react to input, but we can remake the rules which govern our reaction to that input.
I think you have a basis of a decent compatibilist argument here. In order to tidy it up I think you would have to put flesh on the bones of how self awareness plays an essential role in how the past determines the future when we exercise our will. This would perhaps deal with your arch nemesis: the epiphenomenalist argument that free will is a user-illusion.
I think you are playing with semantics. Voluntary behavior is still not "free will" in the context that most people use the term. You can define "free will" in many different ways but the point is that choice is an illusion.
A human brain is a machine comprised of around 100 *billion* neurons. 'You' are actually billions of separate, individual neurons, there is no single 'self' that guides human behavior. These neurons don't choose to send or process electrical/chemical info., they mindless react to genetic pre-programming and external stimuli.
It's also worth noting (and studies have proven this) that brains make "decisions" before they become consciously aware of making these decisions.
You can define "free will" in many different ways but the point is that choice is an illusion.
I'm actually in partial agreement with you. But I'm not focusing on voluntary action or "choice." I'm focusing on "Control." And not everyone will agree with the kind of reductive materialism you're describing. I'm on board with materialism, but I find functionalism a little more convincing (that the mind is a kind of software of the brain - the mind is a function of the brain but non-reductive).
The point is this reflective, self-aware mind is unique from the kind of "Turing A.I." so artfully refuted by Searle's chinese box argument.
Control is a better way of describing things I think. I'm not convinced by the Chinese Room argument though.
Well I'm convinced as far as Searle's argument showing that a Turing test is not sufficient for proving a machine has consciousness. As far as Searle's belief that this completely refutes the possibility of A.I. altogether.. I think that's a little too bold, even for Searle.
What the argument DOES do (chinese box argument) is demonstrate that we are more than machines reacting to inputs and outputs. Not only do we recieve inputs and outputs, but we are AWARE of those inputs and outputs, free to reflect on this data, and free to revise the rules that govern our reaction to this data - a machine is not have this freedom - namely "the will". Not yet anyway. ;)
I still disagree that The Chinese Room (TCR) does show those things. I agree that a Turing Test isn't sufficient, but I don't think TCR shows it.
I also agree that we are aware, whereas the machines we have built that react to inputs and process information are not. But again I doubt that TCR demonstrates the qualitative difference between the two that it purports to.
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