A tentative hypothesis for solving the problem of free will..

I have written on the problems of free will before. They are sloppy and perhaps infantile in construction. However, one day I hope to solve one major problem in philosophy (this problem is obviously not going to be it, but hey.. who says I didn't try, huh?). So at the moment, I'm just hypothesizing and playing around when you see these kinds of posts. I am a huge fan of the analytic school of philosophy, and so I attempt to state my arguments very plainly, and expound on them conservatively. In this post I will be referring to the problem of whether or not we have free will. The biggest problem with free will (if we excuse the claim of an omniscient god) is causal determinism, which my readers have come across in my previous posts, or have been introduced to it in their education. Although I have proposed a solution to free will before, I was mostly suggesting that: our personal identity is "free" to remake the rules that define how we respond to the world over time.  I based this on the claim that we have a random and unique perspective from a "personal identity" that learns and understands by remembering its experience in the world. But I would like to modify this and propose the following grounds for free will.  





Brief illustration of the Problem being addressed:  

Do you believe the past determines our future?  Do you believe that there is a reason for your actions, and that there are explanations for those reasons? 


Are those reasons grounded in experience? Are those experiences causal in relation to each other? 


Then you believe in a determined world.  "In a deterministic world, everything that happens follows ineluctably from natural or divine laws"(ibid).  There is but one possible future, and if it's five seconds from now or ten years from now, it is determined by the past and you cannot escape from it.  You are therefore unfree, because no matter what delusions of freedom you have in the present, you cannot change your future. For that matter, you cannot change the present moment.  You "could not have done otherwise" than you have in reading this super awesome philosophy post!  You are continuing to read because... why?  Was it because of a reason X? Did reason X have another cause that had another cause?  Exactly!  So THERE!  Free will is an illusion, and where you are today is simply a circumstance of your existence.  Luck and pluck!  ;)   Ahem.. Or so they say.  On with the philosophy! 


Argument:  


In this argument I will not be defining "free will" as the notion that we could have done otherwise. This is confusing because it is asking about PAST ACTION, in order to discover if we have present freedom in action. I feel this is too limiting and ambiguous to start from. We simply cannot discover if we could have done otherwise by reflection of any kind.   By all logic accepting causality, philosophy of time, and so forth, we can only know for certain what we are doing now and what we have already done. Asking if we could have done otherwise might be a mistake in defining whether our not we have freedom of action as we commit action presently. Therefore I will not address this particular point as it has been beaten to death with little satisfaction. Instead, I am attempting to find the smallest requirement for freedom of an agent, even if that simply means freedom to understand or believe, etc. What we want at the very least is this: causal power unique and originating from our personal identity. If we can establish that we have causal power in the present, then we can perhaps start on the right grounds for the free will argument.

• We experience that beliefs affect decisions and are therefore causal factors.
• Humans hold beliefs, act on decisions, and are thus causal agents.
• Freedom within causality requires a causal agent to have causal power
• Causal power is the capacity to affect change unique and in origin to the causal agent
• Belief in "free will" affects change unique and in origin to the causal agent*
• Belief in "free will" therefore has causal power
• Humans believe in free will
• Therefore, Humans have causal power
• Thus humans have a kind of freedom.  

* Premise five is what my argument rests on.  It is established by asking what "free will" is (a belief that we are free), and what that belief is in relation to (our personal identity, which is unique for all individuals).  If our belief in free will is about the nature of our existence and the nature of our perspective, then it precedes all action as a universal context for all thought, understanding, and decisions. It creates freedom to make spontaneousness decisions while in the causal river of experience.

Belief that we have free will, and the natural and inherent feeling that seems to cause said belief, is universally part of our conscious decisions. It is therefore an axiom or universal constant for all intent, decision, and thought that operates under the assumption of free will. It thus creates causal influence on all of our thoughts, intentions, and actions. Because this belief is both constant and about a changing identity, it creates a context for a unique identity to react by. It is therefore a unique causal power determining our actions. The belief is about ourselves, and it determines action originating from the self. It would seem then, in a sense, we have a kind of free will in our belief in free will.


This solution gives causal criteria on human decisions within the causal chain leading to those decisions. The causal tree appears thus: Outside causes meet with Internal causes, which sometimes meet with the conscious self, which believes itself to be free (and perhaps other things), and it reacts to previous causal input based on the belief that it is, despite all contradiction, acting freely. Human decisions are filtered by personal beliefs about the self, which causes personal responses which are unique to a conscious identity (not just the "I" but all the "I" refers to, such as previous experience, appearance, genetics, and memory). All actions by an agent believed to be of his free will is therefore partially caused by his very belief in free will. That belief, though constant, is about the nature of your person, and is therefore in its present conception forming and originating from a personal identity. Therefore that personal identity has causal power via the beliefs it holds about itself, and its freedom to respond to an external world.


What's great about this argument is that the "belief" in free will, though it may be externally caused, is empowering the individual consciousness to reason and act as if it were free.  This allows the mind to operate with a unique reason and unique judgment. 


This argument implies that beliefs (at least beliefs about "self") determine your actions. If you believe you are free, you will act with more freedom, if not, you will act with lesser freedom. But also, it implies that other beliefs about self determine your actions, such as confidence, moral integrity, etc.


Problems:  Does free will require "Control" over our actions, or does it simply require that Actions are caused by the belief we control?  Does origin of a cause necessarily prove ownership of the cause?  Does ownership of cause entail a "will"?  Does ceasing to believe in free will necessitate that you cease to be free? If the world is causally closed, does this argument make any difference?


What do you guys think about this? It doesn't necessarily say you are in complete control, but it suggests that your identity has varying degrees of influence on your decisions based on what you believe about yourself. It's quite romantic actually.